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Introduction 
D. Michael Risinger∗
One of the great privileges that falls largely to the chair of any 
section of the Association of American Law Schools is setting the 
topic for the presentations at the annual meeting.  The chair then 
gets the pleasure of enlisting some of the best minds in the academic 
community to explore the questions presented by that chosen topic. 
Most of us who are members of the AALS Evidence Section 
teach the basic course in Evidence.  Since that course is generally 
three or four credits, and since Evidence law, as instantiated in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and their practical context and judicial in-
terpretation, is a subject on the multi-state bar examination, most of 
us of necessity teach a heavily doctrinal course meant to deliver to 
our students a competence about this system and its lore appropriate 
for both the purposes of the bar examination and for conducting 
conversations on evidentiary issues with judges and other lawyers.  
But in our seminars and advanced courses, and in our scholarship, 
most of us try to go beyond doctrinal exposition in any narrow sense.  
In this pursuit, we often take a view of the subject of Evidence 
broader than the rules of admissibility in contested litigation, and 
move out toward the edges of Bentham’s “adjective law”1 to examine 
 ∗ John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., 
1970) (1782).  The 1782 date of completion is given in Hart’s Introduction.  Id. at xxxi.  
For a discussion of Bentham’s taxonomy of laws, see D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” 
and “Procedure” Revisited, With Some Thoughts on the Constitutional Problems of Irrebuttable 
Presumptions, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 190–94 (1982). 
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all parts of procedure that have arguably accuracy-distorting or accu-
racy-enhancing effects on the products of the legal system, whether 
through trial, settlement, plea bargain, or alternative dispute resolu-
tion.  In doing so we seek to examine and critique “evidence in con-
text” broadly conceived, moving from evidence law strictly defined to 
Wigmore’s “science of proof,”2 or, more specifically, to how the law 
should be structured to enhance the efficacy of the process of proof.  
In setting the agenda for this year’s program I have attempted to fo-
cus the inquiry on some of these broader questions of enduring mys-
tery. 
It is an asserted principle of ancient lineage dating at least to the 
seventeenth century that, while standards of proof may vary depend-
ing on the kind of case or issue involved, rules of admissibility (at 
least those not explicitly based on policies extrinsic to rectitude of 
decision) ought ideally to be the same in every context, civil or crimi-
nal.3  It was an explicit policy of Wigmore to bring the rules of evi-
dence more in line with this ideal.4  The reason given has always been 
 2 See the discussion in WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY 
ESSAYS 63–65 (2d ed. 2006). 
 3 The earliest reference I have discovered (or stumbled across) is in an anony-
mous French dissertation on handwriting identification published in Paris in 1704, 
but not translated into English until 1755, A DISSERTATION SHEWING THE INVALIDITY OF 
ALL PROOF BY SIMILITUDE OF HANDS IN CRIMINAL CASES. 
 The Advocates for this kind of Proof in Criminal Matters, first lay it down 
for a Principle that Custom has established it in civil Cases; and thence 
conclude that it ought to be admitted likewise in criminal Matters; be-
cause, say they, in Matter of Proof, there should be no Distinction be-
tween civil and criminal Cases; Proof being nothing else but the Means of 
discovering Truth. 
Id. at 20.  Of course, as long as the general principle has been espoused it has been 
contested, as indeed it was the object of the Anonymous Advocate Author of this lit-
tle dissertation to do. 
 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 10–13 
(1st ed. 1904).  This is the essence of what has come to be called the trans-substantive 
ideal of evidence law, and of procedure in general.  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Mak-
ing Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-
Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989).  Of course, 
Wigmore would not have used the term “trans-substantive.”  That useful term was 
coined by the late Robert Cover in a 1975 article in the Yale Law Journal.  Robert M. 
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 
733 (1975).  While Cover claimed no neologistic credit for the word in that article, a 
full search on Westlaw, Hein Online, and JSTOR reveals no earlier usage.  While 
Cover’s coinage was new, the essential idea was not, tracking as it does traditional di-
visions between substantive subjects within the broad categories of criminal law and 
civil law.  On reflection, however, “trans-substantive” may not prove sufficiently fine-
grained to capture the cleavages where different rules or approaches ought to pre-
vail, and thus I will often refer to “trans-contextual” rules in an attempt to better cap-
ture the right level of magnification. 
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that information tending to prove a fact has that same tendency 
whether the fact is a material issue in a criminal case or in a civil case, 
for the plaintiff, prosecution or defense. 
If all we asked the “factfinder” to do in our system of litigation 
was to deal with fact reconstruction strictly speaking, and if contex-
tual pressures on factfinders attempting to evaluate evidence were the 
same in every context, there would be some force to this argument.  
But it is clear that our trial system assigns other important functions 
to the jury besides fact reconstruction strictly defined, and that the 
pressures and potential distortions of contextual atmosphere in 
which we expect factfinders to work vary greatly from case to case. 
To be sure, we ask factfinders to determine the empirical details 
of “facts in the world.”  But we also ask “factfinders” to make some de-
terminations which are clearly not “facts” (e.g., negligence; insanity), 
but are rather value judgments about facts.5  And we ask “factfinders” 
to determine other things (states of mind) the factual status of which 
are epistemically different from (and less clear than) exterior “facts 
in the world,” and which are generally inseparable from normative 
evaluations of responsibility and guilt.6  Might the kinds of informa-
tion that are appropriate for one function be inappropriate to the 
proper performance of other functions?  In addition, in the criminal 
setting, might the mindset which is directed toward investigating and 
producing evidence of “guiltiness” not be that best suited to investi-
 5 The role of the jury in the ordinary determination of negligence is the most 
widespread and clearest example.  No amount of fact specification could eliminate 
the need for the value judgment entailed in the concept and final conclusion of neg-
ligence.  For a discussion of this and other issues our system submits to juries which 
inevitably entail warrants to decide issues of value, see D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe 
Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence 
Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1295–1301 (2004). 
 6 The importance to the criminal trial, and to theories of relevance and admissi-
bility, of the contrast between “guilt” and “guiltiness” was an explicit part of Justice 
Souter’s reasoning for the majority in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 
(1997).  Professor Swift has made this a focus of her contribution.  Eleanor Swift, 
Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 
38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975 (2008).  Other reflections on the implications of Old Chief 
can be found in D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and 
“Legitimate Moral Force”—Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 403 (1997); James Joseph Duane, “Screw Your Courage to the Sticking 
Place”: The Roles of Evidence, Stipulations and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 463 (1997), and Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Co-
herence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 564–69 (2004).  See generally 
Richard O. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries and a Supreme Court Inspired 
Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15 (2002). 
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gating and producing reliable evidence of guilt?7  Can the proper 
structuring of the trial, and adjustments in the rules of evidence, help 
resolve this and similar conflicts, or by the time the trial starts is it al-
ready too late, given the potential for the distortion of information 
that is inevitably a part of a system run largely by partisan adversaries?  
And if reforms might help sort out the informational tension between 
determining guilt and guiltiness, are any such reforms practically pos-
sible? 
For myself, cogitation about these general questions has precipi-
tated a constellation of intertwined and somewhat tentative re-
sponses: 
1.  A belief that the standard model of adjudication does not de-
scribe very well either what goes on in a trial, or what ought to go 
on.8
2.  A rejection of the traditional law-fact distinction as sufficient to 
capture appropriate decisional roles of judge and jury.9
3.  A foregrounding of the legitimate value-judgment authority 
(or lack thereof) of the so-called “factfinder” in regard to particu-
lar issues as a proper consideration in determining what evidence 
the factfinder ought (and ought not) to be given in deciding 
cases where those issues are the practically triable issues.10
4.  A sensitivity to the distorting effects of adversariness at both 
the evidence investigation and assembly stages and the evidence 
production stages of the trial, in regard to case-relevant informa-
tion in general, and particularly in regard to asserted expert tes-
timony.11
 7 The “standard model” is the general orthodox account of the trial system.  It 
has also been referred to variously as the “official ideology” of the trial, the “search 
for truth” model, “progressive proceduralism,” the “rectitude of decision” model and 
the “received view of the trial.”  See Risinger, supra note 5, at 1283–84, 1283–84  
nn.5–10.  The leading distiller of the standard model (which he refers to as the view 
of the “rationalist tradition”) into an efficient and elegant set of descriptors is Wil-
liam Twining.  See WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 71–
82 (1990); WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE, BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 1–18 
(1985). 
 8 See Risinger, supra note 5, at 1290–95 (2004). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id. at 1311–13.  On the pretrial aspects of information distortion by our cur-
rent adversary structuring, see RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN 
JUSTICE (2008); Keith A. Findley & Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 307–40; and Professor Findley’s contri-
bution to this volume, Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic 
Science and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893 (2008). 
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5.  An emphasis on system reform upstream from the trial to ob-
tain more complete and less distorted information.12
6.  A suspicion of free proof and trans-substantivity, or perhaps 
more appropriately, trans-contextuality, of evidence rules.13
7.  A corollary belief that decisions on admissibility should be 
heavily affected by contextual variables—criminal/civil, 
fact/value, etc.—and particularly in criminal cases, by whether 
the only practically triable issue is the identity of the perpetrator, 
or whether the case is one where perpetration is not practically in 
issue, but which turns on issues of normative guiltiness rather 
than factual guilt.14
These were the general issues and hypotheses that the panelists 
were asked to consider, though of course they were free to select one 
or more for special examination, or otherwise shape their responses 
in any way that appealed to them.  When you enlist giants to aid in a 
project, you should stay out of their way as much as possible.  And gi-
ants we have, some whose stature has been long established, and 
some only recently emerging.  I will call them on briefly, in Morris 
dance manner, and then let their contributions speak for them. 
First comes our emerging scholar, Keith Findley, Clinical Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Wisconsin and co-founder and co-
director of the Wisconsin Innocence Project.  Professor Findley 
comes to scholarly reflection and writing from inside the process, 
having served for many years as a public defender in Wisconsin.  His 
current experiences with the Wisconsin Innocence Project give him 
an important lens through which to view the documented failures of 
the proof process in criminal cases and to give some account of the 
systemic factors that lead to such miscarriages.  He is the author (with 
Michael Scott) of The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases.15  This examination of the phenomenon of systemic tunnel vi-
sion from the point of first contact of the criminal justice system with 
a case involving an alleged criminal act, through investigation, trial, 
and conviction, through appeal and to the end of efforts for post-
conviction relief, is destined to become a classic.  His current contri-
bution, entitled Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science 
 12 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert 
Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hid-
den Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 20 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45–52 (2002). 
 13 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Bound-
ary Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. 
L. REV. 679, 699–701 (2007). 
 14 See Risinger, supra note 5, at 1290–95. 
 15 Findley & Scott, supra note 11. 
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and the Search for Truth,16 is a worthy follow-on to that article.  The 
opening catalogue of structural advantages our criminal justice sys-
tem bestows upon the prosecution should be required reading for 
anyone who believes that the system is designed to protect the inno-
cent from conviction.  Thereafter, he turns to one of those imbal-
ances, access to forensic expertise, and effectively makes the case that 
there is a need for substantial reform in the way forensic expertise is 
generated. 
Next comes Eleanor Swift, Professor of Law at the University of 
California, Berkeley (Boalt).  Professor Swift is a co-author/editor of 
the most recent edition of McCormick’s classic treatise on the law of 
evidence,17 and also of a leading evidence casebook.18  In addition to 
evidence, she teaches civil procedure and professional responsibility, 
and she was also instrumental in the establishment of Boalt’s Center 
for Clinical Education.  Her scholarship reflects her broad perspec-
tive on the adversary system, both in regard to its strengths and its ex-
cesses.19  In her current contribution, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), 
and Criminal Defendants’ Post Crime State of Mind Hearsay,20 Professor 
Swift identifies an anomaly in the treatment of criminal defendants’ 
declarations relevant to their current state of mind, which in turn 
would be relevant to their previous mens rea under normal probabil-
istic notions of relevance.  She shows that, functionally, special doc-
trines have been generated for the treatment of such evidence that 
systematically disadvantage criminal defendants, buttressing her con-
clusions with empirical research on such patterns of decision.  Her 
piece is a major contribution to the growing body of scholarship on 
asymmetries that disadvantage criminal defendants, contrary to the 
claimed ideals of the criminal justice system. 
The third to come in is Christopher Slobogin, Steven C. 
O’Connell Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of Psychiatry, Uni-
versity of Florida.  Professor Slobogin is also shockingly prolific, the 
author of numerous books and articles on Criminal Law, Criminal 
Procedure, Law and the Mental Health System, and Evidence.  Per-
haps most important for our current proceedings are his works on 
 16 Findley, supra note 11. 
 17 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds, 6th ed. 2006). 
 18 RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS, ELEANOR SWIFT & DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, 
EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES (4th ed. 2006). 
 19 Her interest in such topics extends back decades.  See Eleanor Swift, A Founda-
tion Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1987); see also Eleanor Swift, One 
Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer's Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437 (2000); 
Eleanor Swift, Rival Claims to “Truth,” 49 HASTINGS L.J. 605 (1998). 
 20 Swift, supra note 6. 
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the Regulation of Police Investigation,21 and most particularly, his re-
cent book on the epistemic mysteries of asserted expertise about 
mental states, Proving the Unprovable.22  In his article here, Experts, Men-
tal States, and Acts,23 Professor Slobogin expands upon some of the 
themes from the book, explaining in detail his positions concerning 
when reliability thresholds for asserted mental state expertise should 
be low and when not, with illustrations to decided cases he believes 
were decided wrongly. 24
Last but certainly not least is Edward Imwinkelried, Edward L. 
Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law and Director of Trial Advocacy at the 
University of California, Davis.  Professor Imwinkelried is an evidence 
generalist with many specialties.  His first treatise, Uncharged Miscon-
duct Evidence,25 was a treatment of the mysteries of the propensity rule 
in the grand style of the classic treatise, accessible to practitioners and 
valuable to theorists alike.  Since then he has co-authored a leading 
treatise on scientific evidence26 and a well regarded casebook,27 taken 
on the theory of privileges,28 and also served as a co-author/editor of 
McCormick on Evidence, all the while publishing such a floodtide of 
journal articles that he stands as evidence law’s answer to Richard 
Posner.  In his article for this volume, The Case Against Abandoning The 
Search For Substantive Accuracy,29 Professor Imwinkelried raises a con-
cern that Professor Slobogin’s approach to reliability standards for 
the introduction of mental health expert claims, constrained though 
 21 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—REGULATION OF POLICE 
INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (2002). 
 22 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE 
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS (2006). 
 23 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1009 (2008). 
 24 I have previously taken the position that one desirable reform for our system of 
criminal trial would be the adoption of narrower and more stringent admissibility 
standards for evidence, and especially prosecution-proffered expert evidence, in 
cases involving the single practically triable issue of the defendant’s identity as the 
perpetrator of the charged crime.  See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 5, at 1313.  In Proving 
the Unprovable, Professor Slobogin has called for broader and less stringent admissibil-
ity standards when evidence, especially defense-proffered expert evidence, is offered 
to establish mental states inconsistent with guilt of the charged crime.  See generally 
SLOBOGIN, supra note 22.  His current essay helps to determine the extent to which we 
agree or disagree about these two positions and their relative priority. 
 25 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984). 
 26 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (4th ed. 
2007). 
 27 RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS 
FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES (6th ed. 2007). 
 28 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:   
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (2004). 
 29 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1031 (2008). 
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it is in Professor Slobogin’s systematization, may in fact be inter-
preted in such a way as to result in the admission of low quality expert 
information where higher quality information might reasonably be 
expected.30
The presentation of these papers at the annual meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools precipitated commentary pri-
marily on Professor Swift’s article by Professor Paul Rothstein of 
Georgetown University Law Center, which will appear in the next is-
sue, along with a response by Professor Swift.  I know that I speak 
both for the AALS Section on Evidence and for the Seton Hall Law 
Review in saying that we are proud to be able to lay before you such a 
distinguished collection. 
 
 30 In his piece, Professor Slobogin responds to Professor Imwinkelried. 
